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Introduction 
Grant K. Goodman 
The American Occupation of Japan: SCAP, GHQ, ATIS, CIS, 
CIC; the 8th Army, the 1st Cavalry, the 101st Airborne, the 5th Air 
Force, the 7th Fleet; the Dai Ichi Building, the NYK Building, the 
Kaijo Building, the Meiji Building, the Imperial Hotel; Shidehara, 
Yoshida, Katayama, Hatoyama, Nosaka; Japan's American Interlude, 
MacArthur's Japan, Failure in Japan, Typhoon in Tokyo, Popcorn on 
the Ginza. The nostalgia inherent in such evocations need not be 
belabored here. But the Occupation is over, and the thrill is gone. We 
who "lived" the Occupation are greying (whether "romansu guray" 
or not is perhaps not for us to judge), and our girths have gone 
beyond the limits once imposed by olive drab or khaki. For those of 
us who, in the classroom, are instructing young people in the several 
aspects of modern Japanese development, when the Occupation be-
gan, this was, horrifyingly, a generation as yet unborn! And we who 
have had in the intervening years since the Occupation an opportu-
nity to return to Japan have been seeing a Japan now totally unrec-
ognizable from the one we knew in the Occupation era. And yet all 
of us—Americans and Japanese alike—know full well that the effects 
of the Occupation continue to be felt in Japan sixteen years since the 
official end of the American presence. 
Thus it seemed to me as a former occupationaire turned academic 
that before too many of us were too far removed from our own 
immersion in the mainstream of the Occupation, it might be well not 
to attempt to recreate those good old days not quite beyond recall 
but to try to reevaluate the whole experience. And by so doing, it 
further seemed to me that we might with the wisdom of hindsight 
and the acumen of our several scholarly trainings and maturations 
now make the kind of insightful and informed judgments which were 
clearly not possible five, ten or fifteen years ago. To this end the 
papers and commentaries compiled in this volume were presented at 
the 1968 meeting of the Association for Asian Studies as a panel 
entitled "The American Occupation of Japan: A Retrospective 
View." 
What seems particularly impressive in the thoughtful presenta-
tions of the participants in this symposium is the recognition that the 
occupation itself, despite its clearcut victor-vanquished relationship, 
was, as a matter of fact a surprisingly mutual undertaking. For as we 
look back now on the operations of the Occupation and as we assess 
its triumphs and tragedies, it is obvious that in both instances we are 
examining actions and reactions, American and Japanese. And what 
is so intriguing in this interplay is the apparently felicitous mutuality 
of American catharsis and Japanese trauma. Surely such a result must 
be unique in the annals of post bellum military occupations any-
where, and it must tell us something about the cultures, the societies 
and, in particular, the commitments of both Americans and Japa-
nese. 
I wonder what this concomitance of the "American dream" with 
the "Japanese nightmare" can teach both peoples about the nature 
of their respective histories. For instance, can the Occupation of 
Japan be viewed for Americans as a sort of culmination of the era of 
the New Deal? Does the euphoric purposefulness of the Occupation 
headquarters staff, MacArthur included, reflect the American envi-
sioning of a whole destitute and prostrate society—Japan—serving as 
a practicum for the world's most advanced techniques of soeio-eco-
nomico-political surgery? Was the determined American effort to 
restructure Japan from top to bottom a subconscious or conscious 
attempt to realize at long last and in full measure the ethnocentric 
American sense of mission? And does the thoroughness with which 
the Occupation approached its tasks mark a watershed in what con-
tinues into our own time to be a primary internationally assumed 
responsibility of the United States, namely the reshaping of not only 
Asia but some two-thirds of the world in our own image or as nearly 
like our image as the world's less fortunate citizens can manage? And 
further, to what extent has the seeming responsiveness of the Japa-
nese to American "forceful benevolence" (to borrow John Fair-
bank's term) encouraged Americans to believe in their own special 
destiny as applicable in other areas of the globe? 
For the Japanese, how much was their ability to ingest to a signif-
icant extent the Occupation reforms a continuum of the venerable 
Japanese tradition of cultural borrowing and assimilation? How 
much was the historical experience of mass acceptance of elitist val-
ues in Japan responsible for the "situational ethics" (Reischauer's 
concept) wherein a whole society could make the effort to adapt 
itself to the wide spectrum of changes ordered by alien occupiers? 
How meaningfully could the desires of the Occupation be accepted 
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within the broader framework of Japan's nearly eighty years of in-
tensive Westernization? How "open" to change had Japan, in fact, 
become in 1945 as a result of total defeat and national degradation? 
And to what extent does the remarkable resurgence of Japan since 
the end of the war and more so since the end of the Occupation 
reflect the ethos of the Japanese tradition rattier than the impetus of 
the directives of SCAP? 
While this panel represented the most thoughtful kind of Ameri-
can scholarship about these and similar questions, it perhaps be-
hooves me to note here that reassessments of the Occupation are also 
going on in Japan. For those Japanese "interi" who, like Okuma 
Nobuyuki, have come to regard the century from Perry's arrival to 
the end of the Occupation as Japan's "100 Years War" or 100 years 
of struggle against American imperialism, the Occupation has been 
interpreted as a "national humiliation," and Occupation personnel 
have been described as a band of tricksters who entrapped a whole 
generation of Japanese. Okuma, for example, has argued that the 
Americans were "deceitful" in making the Japanese believe that a 
military occupation could produce democracy and has condemned 
the Occupation for its purging of right wing and ultranationalist 
elements as in itself an undemocratic act. At the opposite extreme is 
someone like Yamada Munemitsu who in his bestselling Kiken na 
Shisoka (Dangerous Thinkers) indicts a large number of leading con-
temporary Japanese writers, critics and professors as "negators of 
postwar democracy." Yamada bewails the disappearance of the icon-
oclasm which he believes to have characterized Japan's intellectual-
climate during the Occupation period and sees what he defines as the 
post-Occupation aesthetic relapse as endangering Japan's chance for 
real democracy. Thus, for thoughtful and articulate Japanese too the 
Occupation and its aftermath are currently undergoing critical re-
examination. 
It is evident in the papers that follow that all of the panelists 
brought to their assigned tasks a profound awareness of the kinds of 
problems alluded to above, and thankfully these specialists have been 
willing to share with their peers and their students the insights of 
their careful research. For the three main papers we were privileged 
to have leading specialists in each of the three aspects of the Occupa-
tion selected for investigation. Our two discussants, by virtue of their 
academic distinction and Occupation experience, wete also especially 
well qualified to comment on these papers. 
Vl l 
Professor Robert Ward of the University of Michigan, Professor of 
Political Science and Director of the Center for Japanese Studies, has 
consistently demonstrated in his numerous books and articles his 
unique expertise in the politics of Japan and his particular compe-
tence in the postwar period. His most recent writings include The 
Political Modernization of Japan and Turkey, Japan's Political Sys-
tem and Political Development in Modern Japan. Prof. Martin Bron-
fenbrenner, Chairman of the Department of Economics at Carnegie-
Mellon University, has also taught at such Japanese institutions of 
higher learning as Tokyo College of Commerce, Doshisha, Keio and 
Aoyama Gakuin, and he is the author of such books as Prospects of 
Japanese Democracy, Long Range Projections of the Japanese Econ-
omy, 1962-1975 and Academic Encounter: The American University 
in Japan and Korea. Prof. Edward Norbeck, Dean of Humanities and 
Professor of Anthropology at Rice University, has written, among 
several other works, Takashima, A Japanese Fishing Community and 
the recent Changing Japan. Prof. John Maki, Vice-Dean of the Col-
lege of Arts and Sciences and Professor of Political Science at the 
University of Massachusetts, has to his credit such books as Conflict 
in the Far East (1894-1960), Court and Constitution in Japan and 
Government and Politics in Japan. Dr. Harry Emerson Wildes has 
been a scholar of things Japanese for over 40 years beginning with his 
Social Currents in Japan and continuing through Japan in Crisis and 
Aliens in the East to his most stimulating work Typhoon in Tokyo 
ubtitled The Occupation and Its Aftermath. 
Vlll 
The American Occupation of Japan: 
Political Retrospect 
Robert E. Ward 
While it might be tempting—writing in the year of the Meiji Cen-
tenary—to seek parallels between the historical significance of the 
events following 1868 and those following 1945, such an attempt 
would do gross injustice to the facts involved. The consequences of 
the Restoration—if not the event itself—were truly revolutionary 
when compared to the circumstances of Tokugawa Japan, while the 
longterm consequences of the American Occupation, although of 
major and durable importance, are perhaps better compared to those 
of an event such as the New Deal period of our own history. The 
years 1945-1952 were indubitably a time of new beginnings in Japan, 
but in most cases large and essential portions of the foundations for 
these new beginnings had already been laid by the Japanese them-
selves and the discontinuities in institutions, attitudes, and behavior 
patterns that were involved are not nearly so profound as was the 
case during the early Meiji Period. 
In any attempt to look back at and evaluate the political aspects 
of the American (technically, the Allied) Occupation of Japan, it is 
important to keep this type of historical perspective in mind. In an 
historiographical sense it so often seems that the closer a scholar is in 
point of time to the event that he is analyzing, the more he tends to 
emphasize idiosyncratic and contemporary aspects of the causes in-
volved. This is the epistemological basis for revisionism in the writing 
of history. Where the American Occupation of Japan is concerned, a 
realization of this fact constitutes a warning against exaggerating the 
role of the Occupation itself as the sole or major cause of postwar 
political developments in Japan and, reciprocally, against undervalu-
ing the role of more endogenous causes. With this much introduc-
tion, permit me now to turn to a more substantive examination of 
the political aspects of the Occupation. 
I 
May I remind you first of a few of the basic facts about the 
American Occupation of Japan. It lasted for six years and eight 
months, from September 2, 1945 to April 28, 1952. For all but 
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thirteen months of that period General Douglas MacArthur served as 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). It was through-
out a military occupation. In a legal sense American authority over 
Japan was for all practical purposes complete and unchallengeable. 
Japan was isolated from normal contacts with the outside world for 
most of the period concerned. Her citizens could not travel abroad 
nor could foreigners visit Japan without specific approval from 
SCAP. Both her external and internal communications were moni-
tored and subject to censorship. 
Most important of all, the American authorities approached their 
postwar task in Japan with attitudes and goals that were in part 
political and in part evangelical. The prime official objective of the 
Occupation to begin with was the disarmament of Japan and the 
establishment of conditions calculated to prevent any revival of an 
aggressive Japanese threat in the Western Pacific. As a somewhat 
ethnocentric aspect of this endeavor it was felt that the democratiza-
tion of Japan would provide the best possible longrange guarantee 
for this peaceful and responsible conduct in the future. In confront-
ing this daunting assignment the Washington planners and the Occu-
pation authorities soon perceived that any meaningful program of 
democratization involved far more than a purge and a bit of tinkering 
with the specifically political institutions of state. Fairly systematic 
attempts were made to introduce into Japanese politics, and subse-
quently to cultivate and protect, such basic democratic institutions 
and principles as popular sovereignty, limited and responsible govern-
ment, broad civil and political rights, universal adult suffrage, legisla-
tive supremacy, a competitive party system, judicial independence, 
executive and fiscal accountability, and decentralization and local 
autonomy. But in addition to such specifically political initiatives 
attempts on a quite impressive scale were also made to provide an 
appropriate social and psychological infrastructure for a democratic 
political system. This was one of the goals, for example, of the 
programs of educational reform, improvement in the general status 
and rights of women, changes in the family system and family law, 
encouraging the organization and activities of labor unions, land re-
form, and reform of the media of mass communications. Later on, of 
course, there were changes in the original objectives of the Occupa-
tion. In 1948, for example, economic rehabilitation was added to 
demilitarization and democratization as a third major goal, while in 
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1950 we abandoned demilitarization as a goal and began to encour-
age Japan's rearmament. At no point, however, did we abandon de-
mocratization as a major objective, although, for several reasons, it 
did become a somewhat less salient aspect of the Occupation's activi-
ties from late 1947 or early 1948. 
Any retrospecive judgment of the success or failure of the politi-
cal aspects of the American Occupation must be geared to this struc-
ture of goals. In applying them, however, it is useful to emphasize 
several general points at the outset. The first is that ideal standards of 
democratic performance have no more been attained in Japan than in 
the major Western democracies. It is necessary, therefore, to temper 
idealism with a healthy measure of realism in essaying judgments on 
this score. Second, in doing this the single most relevant benchmark 
is the level of pre-1945 democratic performance in Japan in relation 
to post-1945 changes therein. In this respect at least two more spe-
cific temporal frames of reference are helpful. The most proximate 
and obvious is, of course, the years immediately preceding surrender, 
the period of ultranationalism and authoritarianism that is usually 
dated from 1932 to 1945. While valid and meaningful for many 
purposes, I would suggest that in some respects it is also helpful to 
consider standards of democratic performance in Japan during the 
years immediately preceding this as well, the period that the Japa-
nese call kensei no jodo or the time of normal constitutional politics 
form 1924 to 1932. Finally, it should be appreciated that a judgment 
of this sort relates to past and present democratic performance dur-
ing the postwar period not to prospects for the future. No one can-
guarantee the stability of democracy in Japan, or for that matter, 
elsewhere. 
Given these caveats, I should say that the most important general 
observation to be made about the political reforms launched by the 
Occupation is that they have proved reasonably successful. Permit 
me to supply a few particulars in support of this claim. 
In a specifically political sense, the doctrine of popular sover-
eignty has been solidly established in Japanese public law and in 
judicial practice. Even strong advocates of constitutional revision, 
with a few exceptions of currently negligible importance, do not call 
for change in this respect. Judged by the standards of contemporary 
practice in other democracies, Japan obviously has a limited and 
responsible form of government. The executive is sensitive to the 
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views of both its supporters and its opponents in the legislature and, 
in measure, responsive thereto. Both the executive and the legislative 
branches of the government regularly submit their records and pro-
grams to the judgment of the electorate. This electorate has ex-
panded enormously since the war and now includes substantially all 
adults of twenty or more years of age. Japanese citizens as a whole 
are constitutionally guaranteed an array of civil and political rights 
that is matched in very few modern states. The judiciary is independ-
ent, professional, and comparatively speaking, quite effective. Public 
funds are raised and expended only as a result of legislative action 
and are routinely subject to accounting practices and safeguards. A 
competitive party system has been established and, despite occa-
sional and ominous stalemates, has so far managed to function at an 
acceptable level of efficacy. And there has been an appreciable de-
gree of decentralization of political, administrative, and fiscal author-
ity to prefectures, cities, towns, and villages. 
If one looks to the political process rather than to political insti-
tutions, the results are not dissimilar. The role of elections is basic to 
the power structure. Public opinion has acquired a new role and 
force. The structures of the society and of the decision-making sys-
tem have become far more open and pluralistic. Interest groups have 
multiplied rapidly and so has their influence on policy. The opposi-
tion parties, although unable to achieve power and office in the 
formal sense, have acquired an effective veto over government action 
in certain important spheres. And the decision-making process as a 
whole has become more open, more accessible to non-official scru-
tiny and influence, and ultimately, more accountable and responsible 
than ever before in Japanese history. 
In a somewhat different category it is, of course, possible to 
consider both demilitarization and remilitarization as political goals 
of the Occupation at different points in time. In this event I suppose 
one would have to say that the Occupation was more successful in 
achieving the former—demilitarization—than the latter—rearmament 
after 1950. 
Where the social and psychological infrastructure of a democratic 
political system is concerned, there have been equally notable innova-
tions. The school system has undergone enormous changes. Whereas 
in 1940 only forty-six per cent of children in the age group attended 
secondary schools, the present figure is over eighty per cent. For 
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higher education the comparable figures have quadrupled from 3.7 
per cent in 1940 to upwards of fifteen per cent today. The content 
and emphasis of education have also changed a great deal. Similarly 
the status of women, and indeed of the family system as a whole, has 
been drastically altered in post-war Japan. Of equally basic impor-
tance are the alterations that have occurred in the quality of rural life 
due to improved communications, the diversification of economic 
opportunities, changes in agricultural technology, and extensive mi-
gration to the cities on the part of farm youth. The agrarian revolu-
tion is at last coming to Japan and, as it progresses, one of the main 
pillars of traditional politics begins to topple. The growth and impor-
tance of labor unions has had a somewhat similar unsettling effect 
upon traditional relationships and attitudes among the urban popula-
tion. While no one of these developments leads inevitably to demo-
cratic political consequences, all of them combine to destroy the 
underpinnings of traditional society and the system of politics that 
was associated with this in Japan, and in this sense create a most 
important potential for change. Given the prevailing institutions and 
commitments of the society, the bulk of the organized effort is 
directed toward insuring that these changes will be democratic in 
nature. 
Obviously none of the foregoing institutions or developments has 
completely fulfilled its democratic potential or, for that matter, the 
aspirations of those in SCAP who initially launched the reforms con-
cerned. But while freely acknowledging all the flaws, shortcomings, 
and retrogressions that have taken place from the standpoint of pure-
democratic theory, I still find the following aspects of Japan's post-
war political performance impressive* 
First, there has been no massive or basic replacement of the dem-
ocratic innovations introduced by the Occupation. It is not difficult 
to identify instances of piecemeal change or of administrative subver-
sion of institutions or plans cherished by the Occupation—some of 
them of appreciable importance. But sixteen years after the end of 
the Occupation the essential political structure remains intact and 
operative. We tend to forget just how remarkable a phenomenon that 
is. Certainly few foreign students of Japan anticipated such an out-
come at the time. Most of us—myself included—were too preoccu-
pied with pointing out the yawning gap that seemed to separate the 
Japanese political heritage and style from these new American in-
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spired and imposed institutions and with predicting their imminent 
demise or drastic transformation once the Japanese regained control 
of their own affairs. 
Second, the attempts that have been made since 1952 to revise 
the political structure installed during the Occupation have been 
more notable for their moderation than for any endeavor to revert to 
the institutions and practices of prewar Japan. The most full-dress 
example of such an attempt is to be found, of course, in the proceed-
ings of the Kempo Chosakai or Commission on the Constitution that 
functioned between 1957 and 1964. As one reviews both their objec-
tions to the constitution of 1946 and their proposals for changes 
therein, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the consideration 
that affected most of them most deeply was an entirely understand-
able sense of the fundamental indignity of having a constitution that 
was originally written by foreigners in a foreign language and then 
imposed upon them by means that at the very least raised substantial 
doubt about the meaningfulness of Japanese participation in the de-
cisions involved. With very few exceptions, however, their substan-
tive suggestions for change have been in no way startling and in no 
serious way calculated to alter or subvert the democratic foundations 
of the political system. 
Third, this is the more surprising and impressive when one consid-
ers how great are the differences in basic power structure and in 
political process that distinguish postwar from prewar Japan. While I 
do not subscribe to the thesis that Japan in the thirties and early 
forties was a Fascist state, it most certainly was an extremely author-
itarian one. Furthermore, this particular governmental form was the 
product of what is undoubtedly a dominant authoritarian theme that 
characterizes the entire known history of Japanese political culture. 
It is specifically with reference to this long history of authoritarian 
political institutions and practices that the political developments in 
postwar Japan are most impressive. Indeed, if the historical perspec-
tive were restricted to only the post-1932 period, it would seem that 
one was confronted with a truly remarkable instance of cultural 
discontinuity. Herein, however, lies the value of the 1924-32 period 
as an historical referent. It makes manifest the minor themes, demo-
cratic in tendency, that persist and interact with the dominant au-
thoritarian theme to provide important elements of support and con-
tinuity for the democratic innovations of the Occupation period. 
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Even by the more liberal standards of kensei no jodo, however, the 
political developments in postwar Japan mark a most impressive 
break with the past. 
Finally, I am impressed also by the sheer passage of time and the 
implications that this has for the continued viability of democratic 
politics in Japan. Sixteen years have passed now since Japan regained 
her sovereignty in April, 1952. Given time, some cultural prepara-
tion, and a level of practical performance that falls short of the 
disastrous, most people tend to adapt to almost any political circum-
stances. It is far easier to do so when, as in the case of Japan, the 
political performance of postwar governments has been more than 
adequate and the economic performance spectacular. Under such 
circumstances the political system tends to acquire a quality of iner-
tia that adds markedly to its capacity for survival. I take this to be 
the case in Japan. 
It is for reasons such as these that I consider the American Occu-
pation to have been on balance a remarkably successful experiment 
in directed or planned political change. I should not, however, like to 
leave the impression that in an historical sense these changes are to 
be attributed solely to the presence and influence of the Occupation 
authorities. The patterns of causality involved are extraordinarily 
complex. My own view of what happened in this respect goes essen-
tially as follows. 
In a psychological and cultural sense Japan was as totally unpre-
pared for defeat and occupation as any major society in history, with 
the possible exception of the United States. The attendant shock waŝ  
the greater, therefore, and its effect was extended and reinforced by 
the desperate economic and physical straits of the populace in gen-
eral during the early postwar years. The most important political 
consequence of these circumstances was an intially rather unfocussed 
sense of disillusionment with the political leadership and institutions 
that had brought the country to such a sad pass. Scapegoats were a 
political and psychological necessity and in practice the militarists 
and ultranationalists were cast for this role with minor parts reserved 
for a somewhat motley assortment of former conservative politicians, 
ideologues, and professional bureaucrats. This sense of disillusion-
ment and blame attached also to the political system with which 
these individuals had been associated, particularly to the institutions 
and practices that had developed since 1932. The general conse-
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quence of this combination of circumstances v/as to produce a sort 
of massive but initially unfocussed potentiality for political change in 
postwar Japan. The society and many of its institutions were, for the 
time being, in a far more than ordinary condition of plasticity or 
malleability. This is the passive or pre-disposing side of the pattern of 
causality involved. 
Two further groups of factors of major importance must be added 
to this. The first is the pressure of a technically all-powerful Allied 
Occupation committed to a program of democratization and 
equipped with a growing arsenal of plans to this end and designs for 
acheiving these plans. The second is the persistence throughout post-
Restoration Japanese history of a relatively liberal and democratic 
element in the society's political culture. Japan's is not a monolithic 
political culture in which only the institutions and practices of au-
thoritarianism prevailed. In modern times there has always been a 
relatively liberal element as well, normally associated with the politi-
cal parties. 
One hesitates to say that one of these factors—the Occupation, 
for example—was basically more important than the other—the lib-
eral tradition in Japan. The Occupation undoubtedly catalyzed the 
entire process and was responsible for the imposition of particular 
formats and timings on the entire process of political change in post-
war Japan. There is little that suggests that the Japanese, if left to 
their own devices, would have produced substantially equivalent re-
sults. Also the Occupation was in a position to eliminate or quell the 
forces of domestic opposition to changes of a democratic character 
and thus, so to speak, to hold the field for the more democratic 
elements in Japanese society until they were better able to go it 
alone. 
But, on the other hand, without substantial and durable support 
on the Japanese side the whole edifice of change would have col-
lapsed with the withdrawal of the American forces. That it has not 
done so is testimony to the vitality of the relatively liberal strain in 
Japan's political tradition and to the capacity of the exponents of 
this liberal strain to expand their support and strength under the 
favorable conditions of plasticity and new opportunities that existed 
in postwar Japan. Of great importance also were the operational 
skills that the Japanese had acquired since 1890 in the conduct of 
elections, party affairs, parliamentary government, etc. These skills 
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were quite readily convertible to the management of the more demo-
cratic apparatus of state in postwar Japan. 
If one looks at postwar Japanese politics in this light, the discon-
tinuities become less profound and the role of the Occupation is 
reduced from that of deus ex machina to that of essential catalyst 
and form-giver. Under such circumstances it is obvious that whatever 
the degree of success that may be attributed to these postwar politi-
cal changes in Japan, the credit is certainly to be shared between the 
domestic and the foreign forces involved. 
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The American Occupation of Japan: 
Economic Retrospect 
Martin Bronfenbrenner 
God loves Americans, and the Oriental gods love Japanese, else the 
Occupation of Japan could never have succeeded—i/arry Emerson Wildes 
Occupation, Reconstruction, and Development 
The 99 44/100 per cent American occupation of Japan became, 
within a few months of the end of World War II, a venture in eco-
nomic reconstruction. Like other large-scale reconstruction ventures, 
it was closely allied to a venture in economic development. Therein 
lies much of its general interest and importance. 
The Occupation involved a reversal of the development check 
imposed by domestic war damage, plus the loss of monopoly privi-
leges in the import markets for finished goods and the export mar-
kets for raw materials and labor of countries which had been Japan's 
overseas Empire. These losses were severe. I shall not burden you 
with statistical guesstimates, but the war damage alone, exclusive of 
neglected depreciation, has been estimated at one-fourth of Japan's 
pre-war national non-human wealth, including land but excluding 
"human capital."1 However, labor skills, land, and social overhead 
capital had survived with relatively minor damage. 
Economists should also note that Japanese self-confidence, along 
the lines of "we did it before, we can do it again," revived within 
perhaps two or two and a half years after the first shock of defeat 
had passed, and after it became clear that no wholesale destruction-
or dismantling of Japanese industry was in the cards. I think we can 
agree that shortages of labor skills, social overhead, and what social 
psychologists call "achievement motivation" are more important in 
holding back genuinely under-developed countries than is yet recog-
nized in either formal-economic models or empirical-economic in-
put-output tables. To the extent that Japan retained them all, or 
recovered them by, say, 1948, the Occupation's reconstruction prob-
lem was less acute than a genuine development problem of the same 
magnitude would have been. 
Biases of the Writer 
As an ex-Occupationnaire, I find it difficult to control my preju-
dices when considering any aspect of the Occupation. Fortunately, 
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my two biases pull me in opposite directions. On the one hand, the 
Occupation gave me (at the expense of poverty-stricken Japanese) a 
higher standard of living than I ever enjoyed before, and possibly 
since. But then, after a year of this unearned increment, the Occupa-
tion nearly expelled me from Japan, branded as a subversive or pro-
Communist. And so, you see, I can be more or less "objective" about 
it. 
On balance, my position is that the anti-Occupation reaction, 
since General MacArthur's ouster in 1951 and the resumption of 
complete Japanese sovereignty a year later, has been extreme and 
unfair to MacArthur's accomplishments. This is particularly true in 
Japan, where the Korean War tends to receive all the credit for 
sparking Japan's recovery without reference to the years preceding. 
Handicaps of the Occupation 
A principal reason for harshness in judging the Occupation has 
been bedazzlement with its ostensibly unlimited power to "roll up its 
sleeves and make Japan over," and forgetfulness of the handicaps 
under the dictatorial surface. I should like, therefore, to consider a 
half dozen of these handicaps, which are frequently overlooked, and 
which often apply to similar operations elsewhere. 
1. Perhaps the most important handicap of the Occupation was its 
impermanence, which was anticipated from the outset. (It lasted less 
than seven years, until 1952; original hopes were for only three or 
four years.) Impermanence led, on the Japanese side, to passive re-
sistance and waiting the Occupation out. It led, on the American 
side, to excessive zeal and haste, ramming reforms down Japanese 
throats in a race against time, without regard for Japanese opinion. 
2. Second only to impermanence were the personnel inadequacies 
under which the Occupation suffered at all levels. The civilian work-
ing staff included too few people for the job assigned them, and 
those few were overly concentrated in Tokyo. The great majority 
undertook their jobs with little or no background in Japanese lan-
guage, history, culture or institutions. They were, furthermore, under 
the control of military men less prepared than themselves for the 
responsibilities of civil government. For example, the major interest 
of the general supervising the entire Economic and Scientific Section 
of MacArthur's headquarters (called SCAP, or the Supreme Com-
mander for the Allied Powers) was the revival of professional baseball 
in Japan. One of the historical sections was governed for a time by a 
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military efficiency expert who regulated the output of history at so 
many paragraphs per historian per day.2 Some of the top-ranking 
civilians, too, being ex-soldiers as well as economists or sociologists, 
saw their functions as anticipating and rationalizing every twist and 
turn in the thinking of their military superiors, and they often acted 
as advocates or yes-men rather than as intellects or consciences. 
A final personnel problem was the rapidity of turnover, possibly 
leading to a downward trend in quality.3 Military rotation, opportu-
nities in the United States, and private business in Japan continually 
skimmed the cream of the SCAP civilian and military economists 
away from their Occupation jobs. (Certain of these jobs had been 
assumed at the outset on a leave-of-absence basis from some Washing-
ton bureau or university campus.) Special "Missions" supplementing 
the efforts of the regular staff, were usually one- or two-shot affairs, 
lasting a month or two at a time. Mission members sometimes had 
even less Japanese background than the Occupationaires and (in most 
cases) little or no liaison with them. In addition, the staff tended 
toward jealousy of the Mission's prestige and glamour and to resent-
ment of the derogation implied in the Mission's being sent for in the 
first place. They were occasionally incapable of understanding, let 
alone supplementing, technical details of the sketchy Mission recom-
mendations whose broad outlines they were expected to implement. 
As if this were not enough, rivalry and intrigue within Mac Arthur's 
inner circle resulted in periodic "purges" of the losing general's or 
colonel's subordinates. These purges are best described as McCarthy-
ism before McCarthy. I have no idea how many professional careers 
they affected, either temporarily or permanently, or how many peo-
ple they transformed, temporarily or permanently, from men into 
mice. 
3. For all its power as seen by the Japanese, the Occupation was 
subject to every change of American policy toward East Asia. These 
changes in turn affected what the Occupation was trying to do in 
Japan and to its Japanese wards. A major policy watershed, of 
course, was the decline and fall of the Kuomintang on the mainland 
of China in 1948-1949. Prior to 1948, high policy had been to build 
up China at Japan's expense. This meant, for Japan, holding down 
heavy industry to the amount required for her 1934-36 living stand-
ard, and the dismantling of a constantly re-estimated number of 
plants which had produced war materials. (Some of these were to be 
13 
shipped to various Allied countries, primarily China, as reparations.) 
It also meant a punitive policy toward traditionalist Japanese and 
toleration if not support for the Japanese Left. In and after 1948, 
policy changed to the restoration of Japan's pre-war position as the 
"workshop of Asia" and to the preservation of her economy as far as 
possible from Socialist encroachments. 
4. The Occupation was harassed constantly by suspicion from 
business circles in the United States itself. To some extent, this came 
from firms and industries fearful of Japanese competition at home 
and in world markets. Primarily, however, the suspicion of American 
business was focused upon left-wing New Dealers in the SCAP or-
ganization, with previous experience in such "anti-business" agencies 
as the Office of Price Administration and the Anti-Trust Division of 
the Department of Justice. Briefly, American business feared the 
development in Japan of blueprints for direct and indirect control of 
business, which could be applied in America at some future date. 
5. We have spoken already of Japanese attempts to wait the Occu-
pation out. The motivation for these attempts was, naturally enough, 
suspicion of specific Occupation policies by conservative Japanese. 
This suspicion was focused along two lines and formed a dilemma to 
which the Occupation never found an appropriate answer. If Occupa-
tion policy involved "reform" along the lines of American practice, 
the Japanese answer was "Japan is not America." If, on the other 
hand, an Occupation policy differed from American practice, and 
particularly if it was of innovative character, the Japanese criticism 
was: "Too theoretical—Japanese are not guinea pigs!" 
6. The final handicap of the Occupation was the weakness of 
co-ordination, or what we call today the "systems approach," as 
between its several sections and bureaus. These often operated at 
cross purposes, each striving for some particular bits of recovery or 
reform regardless of cost or other implications to the economy as a 
whole. One focus of conflict was the national budget, where Occupa-
tion offices lined up to seek tax exemptions, subsidies, and expendi-
tures for their favored sectors, projects, and for special groups of 
"their" Japanese. The sum total of all these privileges, despite the 
best efforts of the Finance and Public Finance Divisions, came to 
more than Japan could afford, especially after inclusion of extrava-
gant "termination of war" expenses to support the Occupation itself. 
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Three Occupation Successes 
The remainder of this paper will consider three substantially suc-
cessful Occupation programs in the economic sphere, and then three 
partial or complete failures. My thesis is that the successes did not 
require the co-operation of many Japanese, other than their immedi-
ate beneficiaries, and therefore lay within the Occupation's power. 
When we come to the failures, I shall argue, more general Japanese 
co-operation would have been required, but was not achieved. 
The three successes I have in mind—and they are not the only 
ones I might have chosen—are the relief and rehabilitation program, 
the agricultural land reform, and the control of American "carpet-
baggers." 
1. In point of time, relief and rehabilitation was the first program 
to get under way, despite the Occupation's initial disclaimer of re-
sponsibility in these fields.4 It was also one of the longest lasting, 
continuing after Japan recovered her independence and the Occupa-
tion shut up shop. It was a highly expensive program, amounting to 
$2,118 billion in aid alone over the period from September 1945 to 
December 1951. This estimate ignores entirely $1,565 billion of 
"procurement" in 1950-52 connected with the Korean War, some 
proportion of which might have been reclassified as aid.5 
The accomplishments of this $2 billion-plus program are well 
known on the political side, more dubious on the economic one. It 
clearly reduced epidemic disease, starvation, and civil disturbance in 
the early postwar years, although it could not eliminate them com-
pletely. (Cynics suggest that its main motive may have been to keepr 
Japan safe for the Occupation itself.) The program also assisted in 
the repatriation of six million Japanese refugees or repatriates. These 
included, in addition to war prisoners, civilians who had settled in 
China, Manchuria, and the former Overseas Empire (Korea, Taiwan, 
and the South Seas). At the same time, the program thwarted Com-
munist hopes for a fifth column of former Siberian war prisoners, for 
food riots, or for general strikes. The program also began, on its 
industrial front, the reconstruction and modernization of Japanese 
manufacturing, and included technical assistance on a scale larger 
than President Truman's later Point Four provided for any develop-
ing country. In Japan itself, there is a tendency to downgrade this aid 
and date the beginning of real recovery from the Korean War of 
1950-52. This feeling was not shared, while the Occupation's pro-
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gram was under way, by other Asian countries. Korea, Taiwan, and 
the Philippines, and also China before 1948, were all extremely jeal-
ous particularly of the industrial aspect of American assistance to 
Japan, in which they never shared to any proportionate degree. 
2. The special circumstances of the Occupation permitted SCAP 
to ride roughshod over agricultural landlords' interests, and redistrib-
ute some 38 per cent of Japan's agricultural land from landlords to 
tenants on terms largely confiscatory to the former.6 To call this 
land reform a success is not to credit it with positive contribution to 
the country's recovery, but rather to point out its political impli-
cations. Combined with parity prices for the farmer's major crops 
(after an American model generally regretted by economists in its 
country of origin) Japanese land reform raised peasant living stand-
ards, both absolutely and relatively to city dwellers. This in turn has 
created in the countryside a mass political base for anti-Socialist 
parties and against any proposal for agricultural collectivism. In ret-
rospect, this political effect seems to have been the principal purpose 
of the reform all along, not only in Japan, but in other Asian coun-
tries where land reform "American-style" has been attempted. 
Unlike some other experiments in land reform, the Japanese one 
was carried on without reducing Japanese agricultural productivity. 
As a matter of fact, the steady postwar increase in agricultural pro-
ductivity is the main factor holding Japan's staple food import per-
centage to approximately its prewar level or 15 per cent despite a 30 
per cent rise in population! It is still a matter of dispute (largely 
ideological) whether agricultural productivity might not have' in-
creased even more under a collectivist program. The Marxist majority 
of Japanese agricultural economists are sure that it would have done 
so. The "modern economic" minority are equally sure that it would 
not. Not being either an ideologue or an agricultural economist, I 
must confess myself unable to take a stand on this important issue. 
3. The last economic success of the Occupation that I want to 
mention is the anti-carpetbagger program. A carpetbagger, as we re-
member from the history of the period immediately following the 
American Civil War, comes to an occupied area with an occupying 
army (of which he may be a member). He then takes advantage of his 
special status in that area to acquire property or business connections 
"on the cheap," if not by force or fraud. 
MacArthur's Japan was full of rumors of carpetbagging. They 
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circulated both among Japanese and Americans. I was myself assured 
time after time, chiefly by left-wing Japanese professors and stu-
dents, that this or that factory, dockyard, department store, or 
choice block of downtown real estate was already owned by some 
American or some American company. In due time, I was told, 
American ownership would be revealed. 
SCAP as an organization, although not all members of its civilian 
and military staff, tried as a policy matter to eliminate this carpet-
bagging. Apart from criminal prosecution in flagrant cases involving 
theft, bribery, or black-marketing, its main weapon was exchange 
control, under which the proceeds of the eventual sale of Japanese 
property could not legally be withdrawn from Japan. 
Post-Occupation results seem to have belied the rumors which I 
heard. No significant fraction of Japanese landed property or capital 
wealth seems to have found its way into American hands. Carpetbag-
ging seems to have been confined to personal or consumers' capital 
(kimonos, books, objets d'art) which Occupationaires and others 
could take home with them. The question remains, how much of this 
record is really due to Occupation policy, and how much to forecast-
ing errors by individual Americans about Japan's economic future. 
Japanese real estate, to cite one example, remained extremely cheap 
(but not recognized as any great bargain) all through the Occupation 
and into the mid-fifties. One wonders how much Americans might 
have bought up, despite Occupation policy, if they had forecast real-
estate values of the mid-sixties fifteen or twenty years in advance. 
Three Occupation Failures 
We turn next to three occupation failures in the economic sphere. 
My thesis is that they occurred primarily in fields where, for all 
SCAP's "lack of humility bordering on pretensions to infallibility" 
and "occasional tendency to rattle sabres and settle an argument by 
pounding the table and invoking the authority of the Occupation,"7 
Japanese interests adversely affected could outsmart the excessively 
mobile Occupation personnel or wait for the resoration of Japanese 
independence. In addition, however, positive economic errors in the 
Occupation's higher echelons played an important part in at least one 
instance—the Japanese inflation of 1945-1948. 
1. Let us, then, consider the Japanese inflation over the four-year 
interval 1945-49 as the Occupation's first economic failure. (The 
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disinflationary reforms of Mr. Joseph Dodge and Professor Carl 
Shoup took over for approximately a year in 1949. The subsequent 
resumption of inflation, at a slower pace, is associated with the Ko-
rean War.) 
The Occupation inflation was a major one, although never attain-
ing the technical dimensions of hyper-inflation, namely, a price rise 
of at least 50 per cent per month.8 With 1934-36 as 100, the index 
of Japanese wholesale prices rose from 350 in 1945 to 20,876 in 
1949. A similar series for retail prices in Tokyo rose from 308 to 
24,337 in the same period.9 
It is probable that a considerable inflation would have been 
brought on by Occupation blundering without regard to Japanese 
reactions, by reason of the excessive strain the Occupation imposed 
on the Japanese fiscal system. We have mentioned the lack of any-
thing like a "systems approach" on the part of the Occupation, and 
also its insistence on getting things done quickly and irrevocably 
before the Occupation ended, with no regard for real or monetary 
cost. In addition, Occupation policy saddled the Japanese with "ter-
mination of war" expenditures, including the support of the Occupa-
tion and its dependents in better-than-American style. Even if the 
Japanese had been willing to bear the resulting tax burden which 
would have exceeded the wartime one in real terms, it would have 
been difficult to grind the necessary revenues and resources out in 
time. In fact, the Japanese were no more willing to be taxed for 
Occupation purposes than could be expected under the circum-
stances of foreign occupation. 
No serious attempt was made, by either the Occupation or the 
Japanese, to control either the volume of currency printed or the 
volume of bank deposits created to support not only the Govern-
ment deficit but also similar deficits of private firms. It seems espe-
cially strange, in retrospect, that stringent ratios of reserves to depos-
its were not imposed and enforced on the Japanese banks. However, 
the late forties was perhaps the most extreme period of the most 
extreme form of Keynesian doctrine, prior to the so-called "rediscov-
ery of money" at the turn of the decade. According to this doctrine, 
the quantity of money did not really matter. To cite a Japanese 
example of such extreme Keynesianism, Tanzan Ishibashi, editor of 
the Oriental Economist and Finance Minister in the first Yoshida 
cabinet, maintained that no budgetary deficit or monetary expansion 
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could be called inflationary, whatever might be happening to the 
price level, so long as there remained persistent unemployment. And 
among the Americans, many ex-OPA economists from Washington 
brought with them to Tokyo the anti-quantity-theory doctrine that 
the way to check inflation was price control. Supply at controlled 
prices could be assured by subsidies, the subsidies could be paid from 
increased budget deficits, which themselves could be financed by 
monetary expansion. These OPA hyper-Keynesians also found non-
Keynesian allies in Japan, where similar doctrine had prevailed 
among the military and in the wartime agencies of economic control. 
However, the main internal Japanese force for inflation came nei-
ther from politician-journalists like Ishibashi nor from bureaucrats in 
price-control offices, but from big business (Zaibatsu) firms which 
had had war contracts with the Japanese Government. The Occupa-
tion had cancelled the Japanese Government's unpaid debts on these 
war contracts, but not the contractors' debts to their own suppliers, 
or their expenses of reconstruction and reconversion to peacetime 
pursuits. To save themselves, the contractors descended upon the 
banking system for loans and more loans. The banks granted each 
successive application (to favored and affiliated companies) to keep 
their debtors afloat, because they themselves would go under if their 
major debtors did. In almost the same way, the commercial banks 
financed their own loans by borrowing from the Bank of Japan. 
Their questionable paper became the Bank of Japan's major asset, 
whose value had to be maintained by keeping the banks afloat, what-
ever happened to the quantity of money or the price level. 
Needless to say, there was no reluctance, on the part of either 
former war contractors or their banking affiliates, to let inflation 
forgive their debts as the Occupation had forgiven their debtors, 
primarily the Japanese Government. Indeed, it is more than likely 
that, without substantial inflation, most of Japan's war contracting 
companies and the banks which financed them would have failed like 
Confederate companies and banks after our own Civil War.1 ° If this 
had been allowed to occur, it would have been the greatest financial 
collapse of modern Japan. 
2. The Occupation's major campaign against the Zaibatsu was a 
dissolution program whose ultimate failure was as resounding as the 
postwar inflation itself. It failed both to punish the Zaibatsu compa-
nies allegedly involved in and profiting by Japanese militarism1 * and 
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to rebuild Japanese capitalism much closer to the pure competition 
or anti-trust act model the Occupation had in view. 
The major studies of this Occupation campaign ascribe its disap-
pointing outcome to a paucity of zeal within the Occupation, the 
artful dodging of individual Zaibatsu executives, and the insidious 
"influences" exercised by wealthy Japanese over key Occupation 
personnel. Without denying the existence of any of these lurid fac-
tors, I myself conjecture that the difficulty lay deeper in the weak-
ness—one might almost claim, the absence—of Japanese support for 
the Occupation's program. 
Let us explore this matter further. Apart from a few liberal econ-
omists, Japanese conservative and pro-capitalist opinion was pro-Zai-
batsu as well, looking on bigness as an economic necessity and on big 
business leaders as only one level below Momotaro and General Nogi 
in the pantheon of Japanese supermen. Japanese leftists agreed on 
the necessity for bigness, and wanted it brought under Government 
or workers' ownership and control. Apart from the aforementioned 
liberal economists, there was no intermediate group between those 
satisfied with the economic structure essentially as it had developed 
before World War II and those satisfied with nothing less than nation-
alization, confiscation, or seizure by striking workers. The American 
model, with its anti-trust legislation and its purely-competitive ideals, 
had inspired no influential Japanese spokesmen. This was hardly sur-
prising, considering its questionable effectiveness even in American 
economic practice. 
The Japanese reaction, on both Right and Left, to the anti-Zai-
batsu group of Occupation reform proposals went beyond what one 
might call the "standard" indifference, with some concern about 
how much it would cost and which groups of Japanese would pay 
the bill. The reaction in this case was a bitter one, including unjusti-
fied suspicion of Occupation motives. The whole scheme was sup-
posed to be part of some vast conspiracy to drive Japanese industry 
from international competition by making its firm sizes uneconomi-
cally small and its costs uneconomically high. Even when the Zaibat-
su's American competitors joined the hostile chorus, largely from 
fear of a dose of the same medicine in the United States, this suspi-
cion did not die down. As late as 1955, after the smoke had cleared 
and the Occupation ended, I was asked by ranking conservative econ-
omists at Keio, one of the greatest private universities in Japan but 
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with a long history of Zaibatsu connections, whether the ''conspir-
acy" theory was not, after all, historically true. 
In this state of public opinion, the Occupation reforms failed 
almost as completely as though their embodying legislation had 
failed in the Japanese Diet. They were thwarted chiefly by the Zai-
batsu banks, who replaced the family holding companies (dissolved 
by the Occupation) and held the Zaibatsu firms together by the 
purse strings. A second sense of failure was the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry (MITI) which sponsored cartels to cut production and main-
tain (or raise) proces in a wide variety of circumstances and a wide 
range of industries. 
Professor Yamamura1 2 has summarized the problem in this way: 
The dominant Japanese preference, certainly on the Right and to 
some extent on the Left as well, has been for economic growth— 
initially, for rapid recovery—even at substantial cost in economic 
democracy. The opposite preferences of the Occupation, and of sub-
sequent foreign critics have been quite irrelevant in the long run. 
Unsofar as Yamamura (and others) are correct, we have seen another 
important differential between Occupation economics and develop-
ment planning. The Occupation cared enough about economic 
democracy to sacrifice for its sake a certain quantum of economic 
growth. (It is easier to prescribe sacrifice for foreigners than for 
oneself.) The Japanese, like any other self-consciously developing 
country, make occasional loud noises about economic democracy, or 
such equivalents as "the Socialist pattern of society," but will seldom 
risk, for either democracy or Socialism, a tenth of a point of meas-
ured statistical growth. 
3. Our third and last example of an Occupation failure is its 
trade-union policy. Here its principal Japanese antagonists were pri-
marily to its Left, whereas in the other two cases discussed, they 
were primarily on the Right of the Japanese political spectrum and 
to the Right of the representative Occupation economist. 
Occupation labor policy included, from its beginning in 1945, the 
fostering of a large and powerful trade-union movement concerned 
primarily, like the American AFL and CIO, with economic rather 
than political activity. In the standard taxonomy of trade-union 
types, Japanese unionism was to be business unionism, and not polit-
ical or revolutionary unionism. 
Trade unions of any sort had been illegal during Japan's militarist 
interlude. Under Occupation protection, they grew large and power-
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ful within a year. To this extent, Occupation policy may be said to 
have succeeded. On the other hand, Japanese unionism has been 
almost from the outset primarily political, like unionism in continen-
tal Europe, rather than primarily economic on the American model. 
Moreover, its politics have been consistently anti-capitalist, and 
turned increasingly anti-American in the last years of the Occupa-
tion. At the present time, the largest Union federation, Sohyo, built 
up by the Occupation as a "moderate" counterweight to the "radi-
cal" Sodomei, has become the muscle and the pocketbook of the 
Socialist Party, while a minority faction would prefer affiliation with 
the Communist Party. To this extent, the program may be listed as 
an Occupation failure. 
It seems strange today that so many Occupation labor strategists 
of 1945-46 could have expected business unionism to take root, or 
an Oriental Gompers to flourish, in postwar Japan. Many of these 
Occupation planners were influenced by the Wisconsin School of 
labor economists, who had argued that the character of a national 
labor movement is determined by broad social and economic forces. 
Thus, according to Professor Selig Perlman,1 3 business unionism was 
natural on the American scene for three principal and interrelated 
reasons: (a) American workers were craft-or guild-or industry-con-
scious rather than class-conscious in the Marxian sense; (b) American 
capitalism was sufficiently strong to make general strikes and revo-
lutionary campaigns impractical, even without Government inter-
vention; and (c) the influence of intellectuals, particularly radical 
intellectuals, was weak in American society, including the manual 
workers. So far so good, but in Japan, the milieu was more European 
than American. Class-consciousness was stronger than craft- or guild-
consciousness; capitalism was weaker in 1945-46 than in almost any 
prior or subsequent peacetime period since the Meiji Restoration of 
1868; the influence of the intellectuals, always strong in Japan, was 
seldom more so than after the overthrow of their military rivals. 
Political unionism of an anti-capitalist bent was what one should 
have expected for Japan on the basis of Wisconsin theory, the sup-
posed party line of American strategists. 
Such fatalism, however, was not for the A. F. L. representatives in 
Japan. From the outset they and their allies strove to turn Occupa-
tion labor policy to transplanting "democratic" business unionism on 
the Gompers model, whose indigenous backing in Japan was limited 
to a few labor economists who had studied in America. 
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For the first year and a half of the Occupation, the A. F. L. 
influence on its labor policy was relatively weak, and other Occupa-
tion labor specialists attempted neutrality as between business and 
(leftist) political unionism. This was called by the A. F. L. spokes-
men "turning Japanese labor over to the Communists;" it often had 
precisely this effect. Then the left-wing unions planned a general 
strike for February of 1947. Whatever their grievances—and there 
were many—this was a tactical error. The plan brought on one of the 
sudden reversals of the Occupation line on which we have com-
mented as breaking down Japanese confidence in and the general 
credibility of Occupation policy. The general strike was banned, 
along with strikes by public employees. SCAP's Labor Division was 
purged, and the weight of the Occupation was thrown behind the A. 
F. L. viewpoint—without permanent success. Possibly the failure 
might have been less egregious had the A. F. L. position dominated 
from the start, although such an opinion is seldom heard in Japan. 
The key point of the failure, in my view, is again the lack of 
indigenous support—this time, for business unionism. The Right did 
not want strong business unions. They preferred weak unions, or 
none at all; union ideology was of secondary concern. The Left 
wanted political unionism of a revolutionary cast, as the labor arms 
of Socialist or Communist political parties. 
Under these circumstances, what the Occupation created has be-
come a Frankenstein monstrosity, in the form of an anti-capitalist, 
anti-American union movement of considerable strength. It has be-
come an important but permanent minority in Japan, aiming at a 
degree of political power for which it has little chance under the 
existing (parliamentary) rules of the political game. Its main hope, 
therefore, is to change the rules—less by financing perpetual-minority 
parties than by backing political strikes and mob violence. Its stance 
is comparable with that of the more militant Black Power advocates 
in the United States—but stronger, since it represents a proportion-
ately larger and better-disciplined constituency. 
Summary 
It is difficult if not impossible to summarize this jumble, crossing 
so many branches of social science, in any intelligent way. Certainly 
the performance of the Occupation in both reconstruction and devel-
opment was less outstanding than I remember anticipating as an 
inexperienced serviceman in the relative backwaters of Northern 
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Kyushu during the Occupation's initial era of good feeling. There 
seemed at that time no difficulty in convincing the Japanese of 
almost anything we wished—even those Japanese affected adversely. 
This euphoria, of course, did not last. It could hardly have lasted 
even with an occupation force of philosopher-kings and plaster 
saints, which ours was not. 
On the other hand, looking backward, the record of the Occu-
pation was better than I now think I had any right to expect in 
1945-46, considering its brevity, its overstay of its welcome, and the 
resulting temptation to ride roughshod over Japanese public opinion. 
One thing is certain: I know of no military occupation which did 
much better with similar obstacles in an equally large and alien 
environment. 
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The American Occupation of Japan: 
Social Retrospect 
Edward Norbeck 
The title "Social Retrospect" covers an immense field. Some 
months ago I consulted a half-dozen colleagues in anthropology who 
specialize in Japanese culture, asking what subjects they would most 
like to have discussed. The responses were essentially uniform expres-
sions of opinion that agree with my own. All regarded the task at 
hand as formidable for a brief paper. None expressed any explicit 
interest in the question of whether or not the Occupation had been 
in competent human hands. All rated as the most important subject 
the social changes relating to individual freedom embodied in the 
postwar Civil Code. Three additional subjects were recommended for 
discussion, and I have rated these in descending order of importance 
according to the emphases given them by my colleagues. The subjects 
are then: 
Primary subject: 





I shall first discuss the lesser issues. 
Educational reforms: Among the issues we have selected for discus-
sion, the reforms in education instituted by the Occupation are pres-
ently the subject of the greatest contention in Japan, and many 
persons have branded the reforms as failures. The directive of the 
Occupation forbidding the teaching of morality and Japanese history 
and geography in the public schools seems absurd. The intent of the 
directive was, of course, to eliminate the threat of future military 
aggression by prohibiting the teaching of nationalism in the schools. 
The most contentious issue was the teaching of "morality," which 
was resumed in 1958. The intent of SCAP's directive has, however, 
been carried out. After working my way through one of the series of 
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morality books in use today, I would describe their contents as harm-
less, inspirational pap containing far less nationalism than The Read-
er's Digest but often resembling that magazine in general tone. 
Much argument wages in Japan today about the proper roles of 
the Ministry of Education, the legality and the value of teaching 
morality, the desirability of co-education, and the suitability of the 
division of the schools after the American model into a sequence of 
6-3-3-4 years. The loudest voice of complaint comes from the teach-
ers' union, Nikkyoso, in opposition to the Ministry of Education. 
Let us note that with the possible exception of resuming, in al-
tered form, the teaching of prohibited subjects, no real reversion to a 
former state has taken place: the Ministry of Education continues to 
have a good deal of authority. Let us note also that the vocalizations 
of Nikkyoso were made legally possible and morally acceptable by 
the educational reforms. Dissension over public education is obvi-
ously not remarkable in democratic nations. 
I interpret the resumption of instruction in morality as a response 
to strong national expressions of alarm over a putative decline in 
moral standards. This apparent erosion of morality, in turn, seems to 
me in large part simply a change in conceptions of morality that has 
accompanied social changes of other kinds and tends to be viewed by 
senior citizens as moral defection rather than change. Japan today is 
not a land of moral chaos or anarchy. The religions of Japan have not 
traditionally taught morality explicitly or systematically; the schools 
since Tokugawa times have done so—and for a time nationalism was 
incorporated in those teachings. 
I would guess that part of the furor over education is an expres-
sion of concern over lack of facilities. Japan's lifeline in international 
competition in trade and industry depends more and more upon 
advanced education. Despite phenomenal growth of institutions of 
higher education during the past decade or so, the facilities cannot 
meet demands. 
Religious reforms: For the past four years I have conducted research 
on the subject of Japanese religions. I shall discuss it here only very 
briefly. Reforms in religion brought about by the Occupation con-
sisted principally of a provision in the new constitution establishing 
religious freedom (thus ending governmental control of religion), the 
end of national support of Shrine Shinto, and the associated prohibi-
tion of so-called emperor worship in the nation's schools. Otherwise, 
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the Occupation treated religion in Japan in a gingerly way, leaving 
most matters for settlement by the Japanese themselves. 
Since the end of the Occupation there have been no atavisms. 
Some pressure is being exerted to gain financial assistance from the 
government for the maintenance of certain shrines, and these efforts 
will eventually succeed, I think, because the structures in question 
hold informal statuses as national museums. Some national concern 
is felt over the growth and activities of postwar religious sects, nota-
bly Soka Gakkai, and the possibility of their influencing national 
affairs in an undemocratic direction. The most noteworthy develop-
ment, however, is the growth of secularism. Most of the nation shows 
little interest in religion, and this may be regarded as entirely congru-
ent with legal provisions giving religious freedom. 
Land reform: There is probably agreement that the land reform 
brought substantial and very quick results in improved agricultural 
economics, but the land reform has often been branded a failure or 
only a partial success, for two principal reasons. One is the agricul-
tural crisis of the past decade associated with the accelerated indus-
trialization and urbanization of the nation, which has drawn farm 
labor to more lucrative employment in the cities and made unprofita-
ble the operation of the small farm holdings of which ownership is 
permitted under the regulations of the land reform. The second 
major source of complaint is of unfair treatment of former landlords. 
Occupation authorities appear to have assumed, erroneously, that 
landlords as a class were unscrupulous exploiters of helpless tenants. 
Compensations given to landlords were so small that they might 
better have been called confiscation fees. 
A decision of the Supreme Court in 1953, however, upheld the 
provisions of the land reform as legal. Neither SCAP nor the Japanese 
government could have foreseen in 1946 or 1948 the trend of na-
tional economic development that would make the regulations of the 
land reform unsuitable by the 1960's. Although some action or 
thought of action toward substantial changes in agricultural policies 
is now taking place, revisions of the land reform so far have not been 
great. The outstanding action is the legislation enacted in 1965 to 
remedy inequities of compensation to landlords (f 145,600 million to 
be paid to 1,670,000 landlords in the following ten years). Even this 
legislation preserves the spirit of the land reform: the sums being 
paid to landlords are called solatiums rather than compensation. 
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The Civil Code: Provisions of the postwar Civil Code may be de-
scribed briefly as extending increased individual freedom to the cit-
izenry in general. Its most remarkable features were provisions 
making women the legal equals of men and the abolishment of pri-
mogeniture. The implied effect of these reforms with respect to the 
form and functions of the Japanese family is profound, particularly 
the loss of legal authority of male family heads that the new code 
entailed. 
After the end of the Occupation, some attempts were made to 
revise the Code, but these were outstanding failures. The provisions 
of the Code remain intact today, and there is little likelihood that any 
reversions to a former state will ever occur. To be sure, primogeni-
ture still generally prevails among farm families, but the position of 
the eldest son as the heir and the caretaker of his aged parents is now 
generally regarded as one of obligation rather than privilege. Younger 
brothers and sisters are provided for, and since they are not tied to 
small farms and the care of aged parents, they are generally regarded 
as being in a position better favored than eldest brothers for eco-
nomic success and general well-being. In any case, division of the 
small farms into still smaller holdings is economically unsound. 
Women are certainly not the equals of men today, but much 
evidence exists that women can and do assert themselves and that 
their status has risen greatly. Evidence is in the forms of voting 
records of women, the activities of the nationally organized Women's 
League (Shufuren), divorce suits initiated by women, the rising num-
ber of female college students, and much else—including the rising 
number of women who desert families. Most striking—and most re-
vealing in explanation of their social ascent—is the great importance 
of women in the national labor force. 
Since these various social reforms instituted by the Occupation 
have by and large been retained, one might well assume that the 
Occupation was successful. But let me approach the issue of success 
or failure by asking two questions: 
1. To what extent was the Occupation truly innovative in its 
social reforms? 
2. Did the Occupation help or hinder Japan, and how did it do 
so? 
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In response to the first question regarding innovations, if we examine 
the history of social developments in Japan since the beginning of 
the Meiji era, several related trends of change that bear on the issue 
are evident. These I shall state in only skeletal form, without pin-
pointing them in time or discussing plateaus and apparent halts and 
recessions: 
1. A general decline in the functional importance of kinship 
and other personalized human relationships, of which the 
most important aspect is a great change in the nature of the 
Japanese family. 
2. Increasing social recognition of individual talent (as opposed 
to status by ascription) accompanied by what the Japanese 
anthropologist Chie Nakane has called a growth of "I-feel-
ings" as opposed to "we-feelings." 
3. A trend toward increasing occupational mobility and associ-
ated social mobility that have been both concomitants of 
and requisites for economic success as an industrial nation. 
4. The increasing incorporation of women into the national 
economy as wage earners, accompanied by an actual, if not 
a legal or acknowledged, rise in their social status. 
5. A growing secularization of life that is attributable in part 
to the growth of scientific knowledge in pure and applied 
forms and the failure of the nation's religions to adjust to 
changed conditions of life. 
These changes did not progress uniformly, and they may be de-
scribed as coming about as insensible shifts rather than abrupt 
changes of direction. The social changes were not planned, and dur-
ing the 1930's and the duration of World War II they were heavily 
masked by the demands of a totalitarian government operating with 
an ideology that had already become obsolete. Economists speak of 
Japan as having a dual economy. The circumstances implied by this 
term also exist in the social and religious realms, making trends of 
change difficult to see. At best the nation—and certainly the govern-
mental authorities before and during the war^were only partly con-
scious of the social changes that had already occurred. These I shall 
label as being unplanned concomitants of economic changes. 
Despite great ineptness on the part of the Occupation, in both 
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fundamental philosophy and in qualifications of its personnel, I 
would describe the social reforms of the Occupation as being gener-
ally successful. This success may, I think, be attributed principally to 
two favorable sets of circumstances. 
One is that the major social reforms of the Occupation were 
congruent with essentially unplanned trends of change in Japan that 
were partially masked from observation even by the Japanese them-
selves. My remarks here are least applicable to the land reform, but 
even land reforms are not remarkable in the history of Japan. A small 
reform was conducted during World War II, and various others had 
preceded it. The reforms were doubtless more drastic than changes 
arising from within Japan might have been—and it seems reasonable 
to think that for this reason they helped speed Japan on its way 
toward economic recovery. 
My statement concerning congruence intends to imply that a so-
cial similarity—a similarity but not precise identity—exists in social 
conditions of the United States and Japan. This similarity I shall 
describe briefly as a function of congruence, in both nations, be-
tween economic and social organization. I shall add that similarity 
does not end at this point. As many persons have noted, an analogue 
of the Protestant ethic is thoroughly established in Japan. The force 
of the Japanese drive to achieve could not have been measured, or its 
effects foreseen, by the American personnel of the Occupation (or, 
apparently, by the Japanese themselves). The social and economic 
changes occurring in Japan since 1952 are probably greater than the 
expectations of the most hopeful of the authorities of the Occu-
pation. 
The second set of favorable conditions relates to traits and values 
of the personnel of the Occupation and of the Japanese citizenry. 
Despite its logically impossible task of imposing democracy, the Oc-
cupation was favored for success fortuitously by the attitudes and 
values of its personnel. I refer here to the overall manner, tone, and 
objectives of the Occupation as expressed by the behavior of most of 
its personnel. To be sure, the Occupation forces included the normal 
complement of exploiters, drunks, incompetents, and ne'er-do-wells, 
but such people were not the mode. The Japanese soon saw that the 
goals of the Occupation were not exploitative but were essentially 
missionizing—to help, and to help set the Japanese nation onto a 
course of life that the Americans deemed the only desirable one. 
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Much of the effectiveness of the Occupation seems to have come 
from personal contacts between Americans and Japanese as individu-
als, contacts that led each side to conclude that the other did not fit 
the unflattering stereotype expected. 
To sum up, I would say that the success of the Occupation in its 
social reforms is attributable much less to witting planning than it is 
to good intentions and a particularly favorable compatibility of val-
ues, consciously and unconsciously held, between the Americans and 
the Japanese. 
Perhaps a suitable final measure of the results of the Occupation 
is an examination of the relationship that exists today between Japan 
and the United States. The following quotation is taken from the 
report of the Japanese-American Assembly, a group of seventy-six 
distinguished Japanese and American citizens representing various 
occupations and including a number of well-known American univer-
sity professors. The Assembly, conducted under the auspices of The 
Japan Council for International Understanding and the American 
Assembly of Columbia University, met in Shimoda, Japan, on Sep-
tember 14-17, 1967. The Final Report of the Assembly opens with 
these words. 
"The Japanese-American relationship is one of the remark-
able achievements of the postwar period. It is based upon a 
wide congruence of interests and has in general functioned 




John M. Maki 
The three papers by Professors Bronfenbrenner, Norbeck and 
Ward deal with an implicit theme of considerable significance: the 
Occupation and social change in Japan. All three of them center on 
the phenomenon of institutional change in the economic, social and 
political spheres of Japanese society, but the extent of institutional 
change was of such a degree that it necessarily brought with it a 
considerable shift in the society's value system. 
Bronfenbrenner has discussed three economic successes and three 
failures resulting from occupation policies. Land reform, a success, 
and Zaibatsu reform and the union movement, both of which he 
treats as failures, all involved institutional changes of considerable 
magnitude. Even though both Zaibatsu reform and the union move-
ment can be classed as failures because they fell short of what might 
have been, the fact remains that both big business and labor, as 
institutions, are far different today from what they were in 1945. 
Norbeck has described significant changes in Japan's educational, 
religious and social institutions. Of special importance are changes in 
the family system, particularly as they affect the position of women. 
Ward has emphasized institutional changes in politics of far-reaching 
significance: the establishment and effective operation of representa-
tive and responsible government, free elections, and the acceptance 
of the doctrine of popular sovereignty. 
What we observe is a battery of changes affecting institutions -
ranging from the family to the national government. These changes 
have not been confined merely to structure. They have been accom-
panied with an even more striking alteration in the Japanese system 
of values. I am fully aware of the difficulties involved both in deter-
mining the content of a system of values in any society and the 
nature and extent of change in such a system. Although it may 
appear simplistic, I believe it is not misleading to state that a soci-
ety's system of values is that set of norms, attitudes and beliefs 
generally shared by members of the society and used to form judg-
ments of the "goodness" or "badness" of individual and social ac-
tions, situations and relationships. 
Both the nature of a system of values in general and the changes 
that have come over Japan's can be illustrated by a few examples 
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drawn from the institutional changes dealt with in the three papers 
under discussion. Prior to the Occupation labor unions were held to 
be so ''bad" that their very existence was illegal; today unions as 
institutions are accepted as "good," even though some of their ac-
tions may be deplored by many Japanese. Prior to 1945 the patriar-
chal family and the inferiority of women were "good"; today they 
are rejected. Prior to 1945 an authoritarian government based on 
imperial sovereignty was "good"; today the politically "good" is a 
democratic government based on popular sovereignty. 
The impressive degree of institutional change with the accompa-
nying shifts in the value system raises the obvious question: Why? I 
do not propose to attempt an answer. I simply wish to mention a few 
matters that may conceivably lead toward an answer. It seems to me 
that a useful initial step would be to try to describe somewhat more 
precisely the nature of the process of change initiated under the 
Occupation. 
In the first place, I would like to point out that it seems to me 
that there are three very broad types of social change under which 
Japan's cannot be classed. First, it is apparent that what Japan has 
been going through since 1945 is not the type of social change that 
was involved in its modernization at the end of the 19th century. 
The differences are so obvious that they require no comment. Sec-
ond, it is not the kind of change that is involved in modernization as 
a contemporary phenomenon of new nations. What is happening to 
them today is roughly equivalent to what Japan experienced between 
about 1870 and 1900. Finally, it is perfectly clear that what Japan 
has gone through since 1945 is not exclusively the process of what 
might be termed self-generated change which normally takes place 
within any society and that arises from the very nature of society 
and its ongoing processes. Although there is clearly a strong element 
of self-generated change in Japan, as Norbeck and Ward both empha-
size, it is crucial to an understanding of post-1945 Japanese social 
change to start from the central theme of this discussion, namely, the 
Occupation. 
It has occurred to me that perhaps any attempt to analyze Japan's 
recent social change might best start from the view that it is unique 
and, consequently, must be studied in itself outside the possible 
terms of reference I have indicated. What makes the Japanese situa-
tion unique, I think, are three key features of the society at the end 
36 
of the Second World War. The first was the disruptive effect of the 
war itself on the entire fabric of Japanese society, disruption being 
both a manifestation of change and an impelling force toward even 
more change; the second, the fact, set forth by both Norbeck and 
Ward, that Japan's society was one that two generations earlier had 
passed through the initial stages of the broad process of moderniza-
tion and was therefore possessed of the panoply of institutions char-
acteristic of a modern society; and the third, the Occupation itself 
which created a peculiar state of inter-action between a foreign soci-
ety as represented by the almost completely American Occupation 
and Japan. 
As I have considered the problem of change in Japan since 1945,1 
have come increasingly to feel that perhaps the most fruitful avenue 
for an approach to an analysis of the causes of Japanese social change 
may possibly lie in a sophisticated examination of the broad problem 
of inter-cultural contact between Japan and the United States. It is 
obvious beyond challenge that although the initial contact was in the 
form of a military occupation, what occurred rapidly was a society-
wide impact on Japan. What I mean by a sophisticated examination 
is basically an attempt to reach a fairly clear and accurate reading of 
the essentials of what has been referred to as "the national style" of 
both the United States and Japan. I think that as the three papers so 
ably demonstrate we already have what amounts to a fairly good 
working concept of the Japanese national style as of 1945 and since. 
The reason for this happy state of affairs is simply that what was 
happening to Japan at that time and has happened since has been so-
visible and so spectacular that a considerable amount of effort has 
already been expended on the Japanese side of the problem. 
As a result we have a fairly good idea of why Japan was ready in 
1945 to embark on a course of drastic social change. But we do not 
know why the United States was "ready" to come up with a policy 
that would fit so elegantly into the requirements of the Japanese 
situation. We know, for example, what the content of American 
policy for the Occupation of Japan was, but no one, to the best of 
my knowledge, has really come to grips with the fundamental issue 
of why it was that American society operating through individuals in 
key positions in the United States government was able to create its 
far-reaching policy calling for fundamental changes in many areas of 
Japanese society. Perhaps no real problem exists; perhaps it is enough 
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to say that "American idealism" in matters economic, political and 
social was the source of both the policy and the acts that imple-
mented it. But if my statement of the problem approaches validity 
then it seems to me that some aspects of the American side should be 
subjected to as searching an examination as has been applied to the 
Japanese side. 
Even if we do end with a more sophisticated view of the two 
societies as of 1945 than I believe we currently possess, we would 
still be at only an initial stage in our investigation of what appears to 
me as an even more fundamental and fascinating question: Why was 
it that two such obviously dissimilar societies were able to interact as 
effectively as they did in the complex process of the introduction 
and maintenance of rapid and extensive social change in Japan? I 
have no idea as to the possible nature of an answer to this question, 
but I stoutly maintain that it is a valid one which has not yet been 
seriously addressed. 
As I have indicated, I think that the Japanese themselves and a 
number of foreign students of Japanese society have already soundly 
approached the study of the Japanese half of the problem. I am less 
sanguine about the development of a parallel study of the American 
role in the process or even of an awareness of the importance of a 
more careful and accurate delineation of the nature of the American 
partner in the interacting relationship. 
I would like to see at least as many Japanese social scientists as 
seriously interested in the problem of American social change since 
1945 as there have been American social scientists working on. the 
Japanese phenomena of social change. I think that there is a very 
simple reason why Americans have not paid more attention to the 
problem of the nature of the American partner in the Japanese-
American relationship: the American preoccupation with self-pro-
claimed failures of American policy in Asia coupled with what seems 
to be an almost pathological inclination to ignore reasonable suc-
cesses such as the American role in the generation of a broad series of 
changes in Japanese institutions and the associated system of values. 
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Comment 
Harry Emerson Wildes 
This is not an age of optimism, but it is discouraging to hear that 
given time, indoctrination and a period of successful administration, 
people will adapt themselves to almost any political circumstance. 
The thesis may be historically correct; after all, few uprisings break 
out against absolutism, benevolent despotism, fascism, bureaucracy 
or militarism while people are prosperous. It is, however, comforting 
that, as Professor Ward reminds us, the political devils are, in the long 
run, helpless against liberalizing and progressive social forces. 
Such forces, as all agree, were operating within prewar Japan. 
Unhappily, SCAP, in all his wisdom, failed to point out that founda-
tions existed for what we like to think of as the Occupation's re-
forms. It was unfortunate, also, that Occupation leaders either ig-
nored or sadly misread the social and* economic situation. 
The causes for the misconception, as Professors Bronfenbrenner 
and Norbeck note, were manifold. High among them was the assump-
tion by military men that, despite an insufficient training, they were 
more efficient social scientists than were their professorial under-
lings. The Occupation included aides whose quality, taken as a 
whole, at least equaled that of the faculties in any university, but the 
military men often did not consult and usually did not heed profes-
sional advice. 
Not all the advice was flawless. Some of the supposed experts, 
perhaps those whom Professor Norbeck terms inept, or whom Profes^ 
sor Ward describes as moved by evangelical zeal, looked upon Japan 
as a laboratory for Utopian experiment. Few of the more radical 
suggestions came before staff meetings but, of those that did, I fail to 
recall one instance in which any psychological, historical, political or 
sociological factor was even mentioned. 
The military section chiefs, the men whom, as rumor ran, the 
Supreme Commander had already chosen as his Presidential Cabinet, 
apparently lacked knowledge of, and respect for, the social sciences. 
The Occupation's official history, so egocentric that its writers, 
on the purely military side, worked under orders to mention General 
MacArthur's name on every single page, minimized all history which 
did not prove Japan's steady lapse into autocracy, brutality, aggres-
sion and evil propaganda. 
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No one could disabuse the overlords of certain firmly-held obses-
sions. Chief among them were the myth of Emperor worship, the 
idea that Japan was bent on Asian and Pacific, if not world, mastery, 
and the conviction that the rightists, though thoroughly discredited 
by defeat, were on the verge of regaining supreme control. Every 
Japanese social institution, it was believed, was primarily dedicated 
to restoring militarism. 
SCAP suffered from lack of unbiased information. Few of the 
policy makers spoke Japanese, fewer still possessed a reading knowl-
edge of the language, and virtually none circulated freely among the 
native population. Except for one GHQ section which hired certain 
officers of the former Japanese General Staff as an anti-Communist 
intelligence group, contact with what the Occupation termed "indig-
enous personnel" was strictly limited when it was not expressly for-
bidden. 
During the first year or two of the Occupation, the period when 
SCAP directives poured out in a paper torrent, the Occupation relied 
for current news about Japan on three sources, all of them heavily 
suspect. A daily digest of translations from a cautious, if not heavily 
censored, vernacular press circulated in one of the most powerful 
GHQ sections. Some dependence was laid upon native informers, 
rewarded for their service by various perquisites. As sweeping purges, 
real or supposedly imminent, barred most experienced Japanese from 
SCAP offices, these informers were largely leftists, most of them 
amateurs who, prior to surrender, had been unimportant; others were 
smooth operators with adjustable principles. Taken together, these 
informers produced a flood of slanted "news," crammed with misin-
formation, distortions, doubletalk and self-advancement. They also 
retailed slander which, because of its "revelations" and its spiciness, 
was readily accepted. 
Most Occupationaires were not, however, blessed with such 
sources; they gained their information from the Army paper, Stars 
and Stripes, then masterminded by far-leftist propagandists. It was 
they who startled Japan by arranging a rousing welcome, on Mac Ar-
thur's sacred sixth floor of the Dai Ichi Building, for the return from 
exile of Sanzo Nosaka. Some misguided Japanese interpreted the 
reception as proof that the American Occupation was in fact pro-
Communist. 
That, despite drawbacks, including, as Professor Norbeck notes, 
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American ineptness, the Occupation achieved such successes as all 
three papers describe, can be credited to Japanese-American co-oper-
ation. Advances toward individualism, liberty, equality, unionism, 
press freedom and tolerance were furthered, certainly, by Occupa-
tion pressure. An annoying query rises, however. Since prewar prog-
ress, however slight, had picked up considerable momentum in Japan 
and since these desirable reforms were causing ferment elsewhere in 
the world, how much change would have occurred in Japan had the 
Occupation never existed? 
Other problems present themselves. Occupationaires who cer-
tainly were not drunkards, exploiters, or ne'er-do-wells, though some 
of us may indeed have been incompetent, worked zealously to re-
make Japan. Did they invariably know precisely what their plans 
implied? All too often SCAP directives used words such as democ-
racy which did not always convey the same overtones to Japanese as 
to Americans. Did either Japanese or Americans understand in full 
detail just what consequences to expect? 
SCAP takes bows if the reforms succeeded, but who is to blame if 
they fell short? Apparently there are flaws in Japan's educational 
system and also in the economic program which Professor Bronfen-
brenner so well described; did the Occupation blunder, did Japan 
sabotage the plans or are American methods inapplicable to Orien-
tals? Then, too, can we use these blueprints, some future day, in 
Vietnam? 
For that matter, have Americans satisfactorily solved their own 
problems? Are our farmers happy, our women pleased with their 
position, are labor and management in full accord and our race rela-
tions joyous? 
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